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DEALING WITH SEXUAL
HARASSMENT IN THE WORKPLACE:




This paper examines the value of liberal rights in
launching a political movement against sexual
harassment, while reassessing their limitations for
changing the practice of harassment. For rights to
benefit women, decision makers must mean the same
thing women do when speaking of sexual harassment.
The paper analyzes how dominant ideology misshapes
the delivery of rights against sexual harassment,
normalizes male aggression, and reconstructs the
struggle into one not about power but about taste, fre
speech, and a conflict between abstract rights. The
paper examines how other rights discourses can
empower women to combat harassment in a proactive
way.
Cet article examine la capacit6 des droits hbraux i
lancer It mouvement politique contre lharcalement
sexuel, tout en se rendant compte de leurs limites pour
en pr6venlr la pratique. Ain que les droits soient
profitables aux femmes, il faut que ceux qui prennent
les d6cisions soient d'accord avec les femmes dans leur
d~finition de l'harclement. L'article analyse comment
l'id6oIogie dominante puisse d6former l'application des
droits contre l'harcalement sexuel, normaliser
l'aggression masculine, et transformer la pol~mique en
une qui ne soit pas i propos du pouvoir, mais bien A
propos du go~t, de la hbert6 d'expression et des droits
abstraits. L'article examine aussi comment d'autres
discours des droits puissent donner aux femmes It
pouvoir de combattre l'harcaIlement sexuel dune fagon
proactive.
The universal practice of mankind ... has recognised the right of the male sex to make the
overtures of marriage, and has thrown upon the other sex the task of yielding to or
resisting these importunities.
-Canada Lancet (1874) /
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I. INTRODUCTION
Catharine MacKinnon defines sexual harassment as "the
unwanted imposition of sexual requirements in the context of a
relationship of unequal power."2 Sexual harassment in the workplace is
the abuse of (overwhelmingly) male economic and sexual power to
undermine (overwhelmingly) female economic security, personal
integrity, and safety. It constitutes sexual discrimination because it
creates a barrier to women's equal participation in the workforce. It is
illegal. The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms prohibits
discrimination on the basis of sex,4 and both the Canadian and Ontario
human rights codes explicitly prohibit sexual harassment in the
workplace.5 Yet studies still estimate that between 42 and 80 per cent of
women are sexually harassed at work.6 Laws against discrimination have
not transformed sexual power relations, and it becomes crucial to
reassess whether liberal rights can ever change the practice of sexual
harassment.
This essay begins with a theoretical analysis of both the promise
and the limitations of rights discourse as it relates to sexual harassment.
On one hand, rights are an important and powerful tool in the strategy
2 CA. MacKinnon, Sexual Harassment of Working Women.'A Case of Sex Discrimination (New
Haven: Yale University Press, 1979) at 1 [hereinafter Sexual Harassment].
3 fanzen v.PlatyEnterprisesLtd., [1989] 1 S.CR. 1252 at 1276-77 [hereinafter Janzen].
4 Part I of the ConstitutionAc 1982, being Schedule B to the CanadaAct 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c.
11, s. 15(1) [hereinafter Charter].
5 Canadian Human RightsAct, R.S.C. 1985, c. H-6, ss. 2, 14; Human Rights Code, R.S.O. 1990,
c. H.19, ss. 7(2), 7(3).
6 K. Gallivan, "Sexual Harassment after Janzen v. Platy: The Transformative Possibilities"
(1991) 49 U.T. Fac. L Rev. 27 at 29, n. 7.
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for political change because they identify social injuries using a language
that is persuasive in Canada's liberal political culture. Rights give
previously marginalized groups a legitimate public voice and encourage
consciousness-raising. On the other hand, the exercise of rights is
limited by the ways in which rights define social problems. Liberal rights
construct power relations in individual terms, speak largely to formal
equality, and provide only very abstract guidelines of what constitutes
equality. Moreover, rights remain reactive: they punish a course of
conduct after the fact but cannot prevent abusive conduct.
Next, the essay looks at the way rights against sexual harassment
have been applied. Relatively few sexual harassment cases go to court:
most are settled at human rights boards of inquiry or labour grievance
arbitration boards. It is important to analyze how justice is delivered at
this level. This section then examines the ideology that shapes the
manner in which boards of inquiry do and do not identify sexual
harassment, how they construct the facts, how they treat complainants,
and what kind of equality they permit women to enjoy.
Finally, the essay examines alternatives to human rights
legislation that could be used to discourage sexual harassment. In
searching for practical ways to end sexual harassment, it must be
remembered that it is only one manifestation of the male/female power
imbalance: it is a social problem that cannot be eradicated by
individualized remedies. Moreover, it cannot be eradicated by the law
alone. Those who seek equality must remain cognizant of the other
power discourses that structure male/female power relations and
socialization, which also call for reform.
H. AN ANALYSIS OF RIGHTS DISCOURSE
Carol Smart writes that, when planning a strategy for social
change, "we cannot know in advance whether a recourse to law will
empower women." 7 Women cannot predict whether the law will
recognize their rights claims or whether they will have the legal power to
define the meaning of those rights. It is also difficult to predict how
dominant groups will react to and challenge a claim to rights. Rights
and politics are never static: they are bound in a dialectical relationship.8
7 C. Smart, Feminism and the PowerofLaw (New York: Routledge, 1989) at 138.
8 E.M. Schneider, "The Dialectic of Rights and Politics: Perspectives from the Women's
Movement" (1986) 61 N.Y.U. L Rev. 589 at 590. Schneider explains that political pressure leads a
legislature to enact a right. The form of political agitation then changes as different groups present
1994]
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Thus, rights serve different purposes at different stages in the evolution
of a political movement. They act as catalysts early in a movement for
reform, because they identify a formal inequality. But feminism
demands more than this: it demands substantive equality. In this
context, Smart argues that the continued pursuit of more formal equality
rights is problematic, as "the rhetoric of rights has become exhausted,
and may even be detrimental." 9 It is valuable to assess what human
rights legislation has achieved and what it can do in the present political
context to promote or to inhibit sexual equality.
Law is an enormously powerful discourse, both ideologically and
practically. It distributes social power and structures the ways in which
we understand and value experiences by granting public legitimacy to
particular ways of interacting. Legal rights are normative: they identify
the boundaries of acceptable social interaction, shape an individual's
sense of self, and impose a social responsibility to achieve in practice the
ideals that are articulated in formal laws. Legal rights thus have intrinsic
value because, once articulated as formal principles, they change the way
society identifies injuries and recognizes an entitlement to restitution.
For groups who historically have been disempowered, acquiring
legal rights is an important prerequisite to further reform. "[Rights
elevate] ... one's status from human body to social being"'10 because,
through rights, a group's experiences acquire public value for the first
time. Acquiring formal rights raises the consciousness both of members
of the subordinated group and of society at large. Further, rights
provide a practical means by which to claim entitlements and to attack
existing power relations. Smart writes:
To claim that an issue is a matter of rights is to give the claim legitimacy ... to make the
claim "popular" ... it makes the claim accessible ... It enters into a linguistic currency to
which everyone has access.i1
When liberal ideology holds as its fundamental values the right of an
individual to be free of interference from other individuals or collectives,
and the right to be treated according to individual merit, it is difficult to
dispute a claim to be treated in accordance with those principles. In this
different interpretations of the scope and meaning of the right. This leads to a further articulation
of the right, this time through the courts, and the cycle continues.
9 Smart, supra note 7 at 139.
10 PJ. Williams, "Alchemical Notes: Reconstructing Ideals from Deconstructed Rights"
(1987) 22 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L Rev. 401 at 416.
1 1 Smart, supra note 7 at 143.
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political context, "the expansion of bourgeois legal rights is a necessary
condition for social transformation."
12
Two decades ago, sexual harassment did not have a name. It was
neither a private nor a public injury. It was simply "a normal and
inevitable activity of men when exposed to female co-workers."13 But
the articulation of laws against sexual harassment made this behaviour
illegitimate. Laws against discrimination publicly condemned the
various forms of coercive behaviour women experienced and
acknowledged the injuries these dynamics caused. The existence of
these laws allowed feminists to name the variety of harassing dynamics
women experience. MacKinnon categorized sexual harassment as either
"quid pro quo" or "hostile-environment" harassment. Quid pro quo
harassment occurs when unwanted sexual interaction is made the
condition of hiring, continuing in a job, or getting a promotion.
Rejection of sexual advances leads to job-related reprisals: firing,
demeaning assignments, or intense criticism. Hostile-environment
harassment involves continued verbal, physical, or psychological
harassment-leering, unwanted touching, comments about a woman's
sexuality-which undermines a woman's job performance, threatens her
position in the workforce, and causes physical and emotional harm.
14
While the Canadian Human Rights Act prohibits sexual harassment "in
matters related to employment," the Ontario Code adopts MacKinnon's
analysis and explicitly prohibits both hostile-environment and quid pro
quo harassment. 15 Both codes identify sexual harassment as an
infringement which prevents women from enjoying "equal rights and
opportunities" in the workplace.
16
The power to name these experiences as injuries has more than
symbolic importance. In practical terms, the law provides women with a
form of redress for a socially-recognized injury. It provides a route by
which women can change the conditions under which they actually live.
In terms of consciousness-raising, the articulation of a right to not be
sexually harassed allows women to see sexual harassment as a pattern of
behaviour rather than as an isolated event which happens to them alone.
12 L Fudge, "What Do We Mean by Law and Social Transformation?" (1990) 5 Can. L of Law
& Soe'y 47 at 49 [hereinafter "Law and Social Transformation"].
13 Schneider, supra note 8 at 643.
14 SewalHaraszment, supra note 2 at 32-40.
15 Canadian Human Rights Act, supra note 5, s. 14; Ontario Human Rights Code, 1981,supra
note 5, ss. 6(2) and 6(3).
16 Human Rights Code, supra note 5, preamble.
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It gives women a stronger sense of self-worth and links individual women
to a broader social group.1 7 Holly Fechner is particularly optimistic
about the potential formal rights have to transform opinions and
behaviour on a broad scale. She writes that new laws promote
consciousness-raising which, in turn,
create[ ] a social climate for rethinking doctrine in which legal decision makers begin to
construe facts differently. Reformulated doctrine reinforces social change and provokes
more widespread consclousness-ralsing.
18
But rights discourse does not inevitably lead to this process of
growing social enlightenment. The dialectic between rights and politics
is more uneven, unpredictable, and inherently more conflictual than
Fechner and Schneider indicate. Rather, as Judy Fudge warns, the
positive influence that the articulation of rights has on the political
mobilization of groups committed to social reform must be weighed
against the results of litigation and the political mobilization of groups
committed to preventing social reform.1 9 The political and legal
discourses that emerge from this interaction between rights and politics
may in fact obscure the power relations that must be changed.
Once a right has been articulated, the group that agitated for its
enactment loses control over its use and meaning. The very articulation
of a right oversimplifies complex social relations and freezes the
meaning of a right.20 This is so because, if universal laws are to apply
equally to all members of a society, they must be expressed in language
which abstracts them from concrete fact and power situations. But
abstract rights can be appropriated by anyone, including dominant social
groups.21 And more ominously, when rights conflict, one abstract right
is pitted against another. The doctrine of stare decisis requires that
principles which emerge from the balancing of conflicting rights be
applicable to other similar conflicts of rights. Therefore, any particular
1 7 Schneider, supra note 8 at 617-1
18 H.B. Fecner, "Toward an Expanded Conception of Law Reform: Sexual Harassment Law
and the Reconstruction of Facts" (1989-90) 23 U. Mich. J.L Ref 475 at 477-78.
19 "Law and Social Transformation," supra note 12 at 58; Williams, supra note 10 at 412; .A.
Fudge, "The Effect of Entrenching a Bill of Rights upon Political Discourse: Feminist Demands
and Sexual Violence in Canada" (1989) 17 Int'l J. Soc'y of Law 445 at 448 [hereinafter "Entrenching
a Bill of Rights"].
2 0 Smart, supra note 7 at 144; Schneider, supra note 8 at 595.
2 1 See, for example, G. Brodsky & S. Day, Canadian Charter Equality Fdghts for Women: One
Step Forward or Two Steps Back? (Ottawa: Canadian Advisory Council on the Status of Women,
1989) c. 5. Brodsky and Day write that many more men than women have used s. 15(1) of the
Charter to raise and to win sex discrimination cases.
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rights conflict is resolved at a level of generality which ignores the
concrete power relations experienced by real individuals. The focus of
rights discourse is always on abstract principles, because
[i]nstead of directly confronting the issue of how best to balance the competing social
interests and policies ... the argument is cast in the form of competing constitutional
rights. ... While it is true that social conditions will figure in their argument, they will
figure only indirectly and to the extent that it is necessary to establish the rights claim. 22
When human relations are characterized as rights conflicts, political
discourse relies increasingly on the courts to resolve social power
imbalances. And this dialectic "has polarized and narrowed the debate
without challenging prevailing [social] practices." 23
The backlash against anti-harassment legislation has used the
discourse of abstract rights effectively to change the nature of the debate
from one about transforming the relative economic and sexual power of
men and women as groups to one about protecting individual morality,
freedom of speech, and management's right to control capital. And
litigation to date has shown that these individualist doctrines are more
persuasive than feminist analyses in shaping the meaning of the rights.
The dialectic of rights and politics can thus benefit the backlash against
social reform as much as it can the movement for social reform. The
evolution of rights practice ultimately depends on the relative power of
forces for and against change.
Acquiring a formal right can lead one to believe that a systemic
power discrepancy has been rectified. But only a minute fraction of
existing social conflicts ever make their way to courts or administrative
tribunals.24 Rights discourse, then, can only transform broad social
relations if there is general knowledge about current conflicts and
judicial decisions, if popular media supply an accurate and
comprehensible translation of judicial reasoning, and if the public at
large accepts the judicial interpretation of relative entitlements.25 There
are many "ifs" involved here. Consequently, the political struggle is not
won when a legislature has granted a right or a court or tribunal has
22 "Law and Social Transformation," supra note 12 at 59-60.
23 "Entrenching a Bill of Rights," supra note 19 at 458.
24 For the purposes of this essay, "tribunals" will refer generally to the different administrative
decision-making bodies which have carriage of sexual harassment cases: boards of inquiry under
provincial legislation, tribunals and review tribunals under the Canadian Human Rights Act, and
grievance arbitration boards under collective agreements.
25 AC. Hutchinson, "Charter Litigation and Social Change: Legal Battles and Social Wars" in
RJ. Sharpe, ed., CharterLidgation, (Toronto: Butterworths, 1987) 357 at 364.
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rendered a decision. There is another danger inherent in rights
discourse: by framing social conflicts in terms of legal rights, the
discourse presupposes a legal solution. Legal academics and
practitioners must therefore remain cognizant of the need for extralegal
political activity in order to give legal entitlements any substantive
meaning. Before canvassing alternative means of addressing sexual
harassment, though, it would be valuable to analyze how the rights
discourse has evolved. In order for women to be protected or
empowered by rights against sexual harassment, legal decision makers
must mean the same thing women do when they speak of sexual
harassment. At this stage in the rights/politics dialectic, it is important to
examine how legal decision makers have defined sexual harassment.
M. A PRACTICAL APPLICATION OF RIGHTS
The Supreme Court's 1987 decision in Robichaud v. Canada
(Treasury Board),26 and its 1989 decision in J.anzen,27 are Canada's
leading statements of the principles for identifying sexual harassment.
These cases have established that sexual harassment is sex discrimination
and, as in other acts of discrimination, the perpetrator need not be
motivated by an intention to discriminate in order to be found liable.
Explicitly recognizing both quid pro quo and hostile-environment
harassment as an "abuse of power," Chief Justice Dickson in Janzen
defined sexual harassment in the workplace as "unwelcome conduct of a
sexual nature that detrimentally affects the work environment or leads to
adverse job-related consequences for the victims of the harassment."28
The "course of employment" in which harassment occurs must be
defined broadly to encompass conduct that occurs in a work context
even though not prescribed in a job description. Not all the women
working in an establishment need be subjected to sexual harassment in
order for one of them to bring a claim for harassment. Finally, an
employer is liable for the sexually harassing behaviour of supervisors and
employees2 9
These principles appear to be responsive to women's experiences
of harassment. But decisions by courts and boards of inquiry, both
26 [1987] 2 S.C.R. 84 [hereinafterRobichaud].
2 7 Supra note 3.
28 Ibid. at 375.
29 Robichaud, supra note 26 at 90-95; Janzen, supra note 3 at 376-80.
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before and since these landmark cases, show that the struggle for rights
is waged primarily at the level of legally constructing the relevant facts of
a case. Fechner points out that "[a]ltering doctrine alone is often
insufficient to reform law because legal decision makers remain free to
select and shape facts in accordance with their socially influenced
vantage point."30 Legal decision makers are overwhelmingly upper-
middle class white males, and their attitudes toward sex roles and sex
privilege are as shaped by the dominant culture as are those of male
perpetrators. 1 Not surprisingly, legal decision makers have tended to
"accept men's versions of the facts as more true than women's
versions,"3 2 with the result that women's concerns are submerged even
before legal principles are brought into play.
The ideology that shapes the delivery of rights against sexual
harassment can best be analyzed by looking at why women need to take
their claims to a legal forum, what threshold must be reached to
characterize behaviour as creating a hostile environment, how tribunals
identify behaviour as "sexual," how tribunals reconstruct the "relevant"
facts and, ultimately, what form of equality these rights allow women to
enjoy. The effectiveness of the rights discourse must be measured
against its ability to transform the social relations that spawn sexual
harassment. Women are more likely to experience hostile-environment
than quid pro quo harassment, but tribunals have been reluctant to
recognize the former type of sexual coercion. This essay examines
primarily hostile-environment cases to reveal the assumptions that have
influenced the legal construction of the facts, and that have thereby
limited women's access to rights against discrimination.
A. Resorting to Law
Women need to bring their claims of sexual harassment to a
third party because employers and co-workers are overwhelmingly
unwilling to admit sexual harassment exists in their workplace. Many
women who have been harassed indicate their discomfort to their
harassers but, whether they are bosses or co-workers, harassers readily
3 0 Fecbner, supra note 18 at 505.
31 See M. Angel, "Sexual Harassment by Judges" (1990-1991) 45 U. Miami L. Rev. 817.
Angel demonstrates that despite social mythology to the contrary, judges, lawyers, and other men
with prestigious jobs are as likely to be guilty of sexual harassment as are men in other jobs.
32 Fechner, supra note 18 at 504.
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dismiss these complaints.33 When women harassed by supervisors and
co-workers complain to their employers, employers likewise tend not to
take the complaints seriously, even though they may be liable for
damages.3 4 In Gervais v. Canada (Agriculture Canada),3 5 a female
employee endured a period of verbal sexual harassment from a male
co-worker, who eventually raped her. The report from an internal
investigation recommended firing the male employee, but instead the
Director General of Agriculture Canada (Ontario Region) ordered that
the two employees "should resume their work and behave normally in
the working place."3 6 When faced with such unhelpful employers,
women may find courts and tribunals more receptive to their claims.
Conversely, however, harassers can use tribunals to overturn the actions
of employers who do discipline harassers. Unionized employees who
have been dismissed for sexual harassment have successfully used the
grievance arbitration process to allege dismissal without just cause, and
arbitrators have reinstated harassers to their jobs with back pay.37
B. Identifying a Rights Claim
It is, thus, difficult for women to predict whether tribunals will
help or hamper their rights claims. But, as a prior issue, the wording of
the legislation itself makes it difficult for women to identify whether they
are entitled to make a rights claim at all. Section 6(2) of the Ontario
Human Rights Code provides:
Every person who is an employee has a right to freedom from harassment in the
workplace because of sex by his or her employer or agent of the employer or by another
employee.
3 3 Aragona v. Elegant Lamp Co. and Fillipitto (1982), 3 C.H.R.R. D/1109 at D/1113 (Ont. Bd.
Inq.) [hereinafterAragona]; Bell and Korczakv.Ladas and the Flaming Steer Steak House (1980), 1
CRLR.R. D/155 (Ont. Bd. Inq.) [hereinafter Bell].
3 4 Olare v. DeFih'ppis and Commodore Business Machines Ltd. (1983), 4 C.H.R.R. D/1705 at
D/1735 (Ont. Bd. Inq.) [hereinafter Olarte].
35 (1988), 9 C.H.R.R. D1/5002 (C.H.R.R.T.) [hereinafter Gervais].
36 IN. at D15005.
3 7 Re Ottawa Board of Education and Ottawa Board of Education Employees' Union (1989), 5
L.A.C. (4th) 171 [hereinafter Ottawa Board of Education]; Re. Canada Cement Lafarge Ltd. and
Energy & Chemical Workers Union, Local 219 (1986), 24 LA.C. (3d) 202; and Re City of Nanticoke
and Canadian Union of Public Employees, Local 246 (1980), 29 L.A.C. (2d) 64 [hereinafter
Nanticoke].
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The Code defines "harassment" as "engaging in a course of vexatious
comment or conduct that is known or ought reasonably to be known to
be unwelcome." 38 Legal decision makers retain a broad discretion when
interpreting each of the three factors in this definition of hostile-
environment harassment.
First, at what point has behaviour persisted long enough to
constitute "a course of vexatious comment or conduct" which becomes a
"condition of work?" Legal evaluation of this point differs from case to
case. Firmly entrenched in a "sticks-and-stones" mind-set, tribunals are
particularly reluctant to recognize verbal harassment as an injury. In
order to create a hostile environment, verbal harassment must be more
frequent and persistent than physical harassment, and its frequency must
be inversely proportional to its offensiveness.P9 Such an open standard
makes it difficult for women to know if they have suffered "enough." In
Bell, adjudicator Shime held that, because the female employee only
worked with her harasser on 50 per cent of her shifts, the harassment
could not be considered a condition of work. 40 MacKinnon points out
that this ambiguity about when women can activate a right can lead them
to downplay the injury they have suffered:
When the design of a legal wrong does not fit the wrong as it happens to you, ... that law
can undermine your social and political as well as legal legitimacy in saying that what
happened was an injury at all-even to yourself. 41
Second, the law requires that sexual harassment be experienced
as "vexatious" and "unwelcome" by the complainant. The law is
formally sensitive to women's subjective experience of harassment. But
in practice, tribunals and courts are quick to overrule women's
assessments of what vexes them. As recently as October 1991, Mr.
Justice Southey of the Ontario Court (General Division) proclaimed
(despite assertions to the contrary by the complainants) that, although
they had been fondled and "propositioned" by a male co-worker, the
"unwanted touching ... was of no great significance to the persons
38 Supra note 5, s. 9().
39 Watt v. Regional Municipality of Niagara and Wales (1984), 5 C.H.R.R. D/2453 at D/2456
(Ont. Bd. Inq.) [hereinafter Watt]. The adjudicator set out the threshold test for verbal harassment
at D/2467: "[I]nsults or taunting of this kind must, through a combination of offensiveness and
frequency, reach a level at which the victimised employee reasonably believes that continued
exposure to such conduct is a condition of the job."
4 0 Supra note 33 at D/158.
41 "Sexual Harassment: Its First Decade in Court" in CA. MacKinnon, Feminism Unmodified
Discourses on Life and Law (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1987) 103 at 105.
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involved."42 In other cases, women have been told that they are
"obviously over-sensitive and over-imaginative," and that they "totally
over-reacted." 43 In practice, then, this subjective standard of
vexatiousness is scrutinized according to an external (male) objective
standard.
Third, tribunals repeatedly hold that women must express
directly and unambiguously to their harassers their disapproval of the
harassing conduct. 44 This does nothing to challenge the male sexual
privilege which gives rise to sexual harassment and, in fact, it normalizes
male sexual aggression in the workplace. Based on a stereotypical
assessment of "normal" heterosexual "courting" patterns, the legal
system affirms that it is "natural" for men to make sexual advances to
women, and that the onus is on women to indicate, after the fact, that
this sexual attention is unwanted. Despite the formally objective
standard of this test ("ought reasonably to have known"), there is no
practical onus on men to recognize that some conduct is objectively
unwelcome. In practice, men are permitted to behave aggressively up to
the point at which a woman responds with an unambiguous "no," and
confusion persists over just what "no" means. The legal system imports
a subjective standard-that of the male harasser-into its evaluation and
blames women for not being clear enough. In Ottawa Board of
Education, a female office worker told a subordinate male co-worker
that she felt uncomfortable with his attentions and, showing him
photographs of her family, told the harasser that she was happily
married and had children. She also asked him to stop coming into her
office (as he did several times a day), to stop giving her flowers, and to
stop asking her out. The adjudicator was "satisfied that she was simply
being polite to the grievor and trying to discourage him in a
non-confrontational way. However, it was a rather oblique message she
was giving him." In fact, he added, the man may have interpreted her
refusals as "neutral or even encouraging." 45 In another case, when a
woman used coarse language to express her displeasure to her harasser,
4 2 Hewes v. Etobicoke (City of) (1991), 92 C.LL.C. 1114,001, as cited in D. Brillinger, "No
evidence of sexual harassment, dismissed Ont. supervisor wins 24 months damages" The Lawyers
Weekly (25 October 1991) 1 at 25.
4 3 Re Canada (Treasury Board-Employment and Immigration) and Broomfield (1989), 6
L.A.C. (4th) 353 at 366 (C.P.S.S.R.B.) [hereinafter Broomfeld]; and Aragona, supra note 33 at
D/1111.
44 Aragona, supra note 33 at D/1113; and Noffke v. McClaskin Hot House (1989), 11 C.H.R.R.
D/407 at D/413 (Ont. Bd. Inq.) [hereinafter Noffice].
45 Ottawa Board of Education, supra note 37 at 179.
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the adjudicator held that, given the woman's "feistiness," it was not
surprising that her supervisor reacted with further harassment. 46
Women's access to rights against sexual harassment is thus
controlled by jurisprudence interpreting the formal definition of sexual
harassment. And this interpretation often fails to accord with women's
own definitions of what constitutes a vexatious course of conduct. The
onus on women to articulate their discomfort to their harassers is also
out of step with women's actual behaviour. Because of intimidation,
shame, or economic vulnerability-the very feelings the practice of
sexual harassment aims to reinforce-women do not complain. And this
silence is later held to absolve harassers who claim they did not know
that the woman objected. This in turn reinforces women's perception
that a resort to law will be futile, and discourages the reporting of sexual
harassment.
C. Identifying Sexual Harassment: Just What is Sex Anyway?
Beyond the jurisprudence that limits the formal definition of
sexual harassment, one of the greatest obstacles to identifying a
particular instance of sexual harassment is the fact that the infringement
refers to "sex." Tribunals and courts are trapped in a discourse through
which they evaluate sexual harassment in terms of its similarity to
"normal" heterosexual behaviour. The Catch-22 is that if conduct looks
like "sex," it cannot be harassment, and if it does not look like "sex," it
cannot be sexual harassment. This discourse transforms the rights claim
into an individualized moral (and therefore private/extralegal) conflict,
and relies on (and reinforces) traditional gender stereotypes to set the
boundaries for acceptable behaviour between men and women. It
reinforces the notion that sexual harassment is about misdirected sexual
attention and not about power. And it fails to ask what it is about
sexually directed behaviour that is pernicious in the workplace.
Some tribunals remain oblivious to the ways in which sex is used
as a lever to undermine women's position in the workplace. When an
employer repeatedly told his female employee how "sexy" she looked
and, particularly, how sexy her legs were, a Board of Inquiry found that
such comments could not always constitute sexual harassment. The
adjudicator held that "much will depend on the circumstances. A
businessman who wears shorts to work or a secretary who wears a short
46 Watt, supra note 39 at D/2463.
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mini-skirt might well invite such comments."4 7  This illustrates a
fundamental problem with the "reasonableness" standard that is
employed in objectively identifying sexual harassment. Men and women
experience identical comments about their sexuality differently. To
remind a man of his sexuality is to remind him of his power; to remind a
woman of her sexuality is to remind her of her vulnerability.48 This sort
of comment is in fact
a demonstration of power politics, an assertion of power that happens to be expressed in
a physical manner. It is the ultimate reminder to women that their fundamental status in
society is that of sex object, and that they hold their positions in the workforce only on
male sufferance.
49
What sort of behaviour, then, do tribunals recognize as "sex" for
the purposes of sexual harassment law? Tribunals will generally
recognize the physical touching of genitals, buttocks, and breasts as
sexual harassment that creates a hostile environment. But if the
harassing conduct "objectively" resembles consensual heterosexual
relations, some tribunals are unable to recognize that the accompanying
power dynamic makes the conduct subjectively coercive.
Bonnie Robichaud discovered that this misconstruction of the
facts happens even in clear quidpro quo harassment cases. Robichaud
was a probationary employee at the Department of National Defence
when her supervisor, Dennis Brennan, coerced her into having
intercourse with him. At the initial hearing, adjudicator Abbott found
that, even though Robichaud had told Brennan on at least three
occasions that his advances were unwelcome, "each rejection was
followed by 'sexual encounters in which it must be assumed she
participated voluntarily' and from which Brennan could perceive that
her protests were insincere." 0 This decision was overturned on appeal,
but it illustrates the danger that a tribunal will characterize any sexual
intercourse between co-workers as a private relationship which has only
incidental connections with the workplace. In fact, this "consent" is
doubly coerced: economic pressure is applied to force women into
4 7Aragona, supra note 33 at D/1113.
48 SexualHarassment, supra note 2 at 171.
4 9 C. Backhouse & L. Cohen, The Secret Oppression: Sexual Harassment of Working Women
(Toronto: Macmillan, 1978) at 42.
50 Canadian Human Rights Commission, Sexual Harassment Casebook 1978-1986 (Ottawa:
Minister of Supply and Services, 1987) at 3.
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unwanted sexual activity, and sexual pressure becomes a condition of
continued employment. 51
Tribunals have even more difficulty identifying sexual/economic
coercion in less overtly "sexual" behaviour. In some cases, sitting or
standing overly close to a female employee, making sexually-degrading
comments about female customers, or asking a female employee about
her sexual habits, have been recognized as creating a hostile
environment.52 But tribunals are very inconsistent. In other cases (and
many of the reported decisions fall into this group), identical and similar
behaviour has been dismissed as showing no cause of action. Massaging
a woman's neck and shoulders, stroking her hair, staring at her, asking
her about her sexual habits, chasing her around a desk in a locked room,
have all been dismissed as not creating a hostile environment because
"[n]o invitation was offered, no request made, no order given."53 In
identifying hostile-environment harassment, these tribunals have
examined whether the behaviour could be construed as a "pick-up."
This becomes the threshold for a finding of sexual harassment. A
woman who worked on a grounds crew was repeatedly subjected to
degrading comments from her supervisor, including comments that
women "were [not] put on this earth to do the work of men,"54 that
having sex with her would be like "sleeping with a lumberjack,"55 and
that women were only good as "bed-warmers."5 6 The Ontario Board of
Inquiry held that "none of these incidents could be said to have involved
something in the nature of a sexual overture" and, given that her
supervisor was "some forty years her senior," the woman "had no reason
to believe" he was making improper sexual advances to her.
57
51 Sexual Harassment, supra note 2 at 171. For a clear example of the nexus between sexual
and economic coercion, see Tones v. Royalty tchenware Limited and Guercio (1982), 3 C.LR.R.
D/858 at D/861 (Ont. Bd. Inq.) [hereinafter Tones]. The defendant employer, Guercio, raised as his
main defence that "if he was in fact guilty of sexually harassing a female employee (which he
denied) ... she should simply quit her job if she did not like it."
52 See Noftke, supra note 44; Potapczyk v. MacBain (1984), 5 C.H.R.R D/2285 (C.H.R.T.);
and Tones, ibk
53 Broomfleld, supra note 43 at 356; Re Canadian Union of Public Employees and Office &
Professional Employees' International Union, Local 491 (1982), 4 L.A.C. (3d) 385 [hereinafter cuPE];
and Bell, supra note 33.
54 Watt, supra note 39 at D/2454.
55 1bw at D/2464.
56 ibid. at D/2465.
57 bia at D/2454.
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In a 1991 case, Shaw v. Levac Supply Ltd.,58 it was held that"sexual references or comments that do not amount to sexual advances
or solicitations may in some circumstances constitute sexual
harassment."5 9 This language suggests a tentative amendment of the
principles by which harassment is identified, and reflects a recognition of
the economic and social coercion that inheres in sexual harassment. But
the facts of this case do not uphold the promise of the expanded
principle. For fourteen years a male co-worker had called a female
worker a "fat cow" and made other disparaging remarks about her
obesity. It was held to be
incontestable that to express or imply sexual unattractiveness is to make a comment of a
sexual nature ... [1]t is sexual harassment in the workplace if it is repetitive and has the
effect of creating an offensive work environment. 60
This conclusion certainly makes creative use of the principles to expand
the realm of behaviour characterizable as sexual harassment, but it
remains committed to a paradigm which draws analogies between sexual
harassment and consensual sexual relations. Shaw differs from previous
cases largely in that it involves the recognition of sexual harassment in
the context of a "sexual put-down" rather than a "pick-up."
Human rights jurisprudence which analyzes sexual harassment in
terms of a (hetero)sex paradigm is problematic, because it situates
sexual harassment along a continuum of heterosexual behaviour that is
more or less welcome. Sexual harassment is depicted as something that
may be an unwelcome or misunderstood invitation to a consensual
sexual relation. This individualizes the conflict, downplays the economic
coercion that is inherent in sexual harassment, and absolves the
employer of responsibility for changing inter-sexual relations in the
workplace. It ultimately turns the debate about sexual harassment into a
question of morality rather than domination, and of sexual taste rather
than sexual and economic discrimination. This manoeuvre shifts the
emphasis on which particular facts become relevant in the legal
construction of sexual harassment.
58 (1991), 14 C.H.R.R. D/36 (Ont. Bd. Inq.) [hereinafter Shaw].
59 bid. at D/53.
60 Ibid. at D/55.
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D. Reconstructing the Facts
If, building on the (hetero)sex paradigm, tribunals assume that
sexual harassment is an individual misunderstanding rather than a
problem of systemic inequalities, they will construct the facts in a way
that supports this assumption. And this is precisely what they have done.
Tribunals analyze separate incidents of harassment in isolation so that
an overall pattern of persecution becomes invisible. The fact that it is
the cumulative experience of sexual harassment which creates the injury
is also rendered invisible.61 Tribunals also characterize the conflict as a
clash of personalities or, drawing on racial stereotypes, of cultures.62
They pit female employees against each other so that, if some employees
say they have not been harassed, their testimony undermines the
credibility of the woman who complains. And, most seriously, tribunals
ignore women's own descriptions of vexatious experiences. They
downplay harassing behaviour as jokes, teasing, or harmless horseplay.63
In so doing, legal decision makers shift the emphasis from facts about
experiences of power and its abuse, to facts about taste and morality.
The case of Allan and Wilson v. Riverside Lodge64 illustrates how
tribunals use these techniques to recharacterize the nature of the
dispute.
At the Riverside Lodge, female cocktail waitresses wore a
uniform that resembled a "genie costume": tank tops and baggy pants
that were slit up the side of the leg to the hip, so that the women's
underwear was visible. Several waitresses complained that the costume
made them feel uncomfortable, and that clients verbally and physically
harassed them. Some clients would stick their hands in through the slits
and squeeze the waitresses' buttocks. The Board of Inquiry found that
there was no evidence of sexual harassment. The fact that male waiters
wore the traditional uniform of black trousers and white shirts was
dismissed as irrelevant. As the women's uniform was designed by a
female bartender, the Board held that "different waitresses ... had strong
and varying aesthetic opinions on the uniform." 65 The Board dismissed
61 See Aragona, supra note 33 passim; cuPEsupra note 53 at 396, 398, and at 400-02; and
Gervais, supra note 35 at D/5007.
62 See cmIP, supra note 53 at 397, 405-06, and at 408; Olarte, supra note 34 at D/1708; and
Watt, supra note 39 at D/2462-63.
63 See.ragona, supra note 33 at D/1112; and Nanticokesupra note 37 at 65-67.
64 (1985), 6 C.H.R.R. D/2978 (Ont. Bd. Inq.).
65 Ibi. at D/2979.
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the possibility that the uniform may invite harassment by finding as a
fact that "[t]acky [the uniform] may be; excessively sexy it is not." 66 By
characterizing the dispute as an aesthetic one, the Board ignored the
actual incidents of physical harassment the waitresses described. In its
reconstruction, the Board ignored the fact that such uniforms encourage
the sexualization of women's work, as well as the fact that this is a
problem particularly for women in the restaurant trade, who have
historically been stereotyped as sexually available to their customers.
Legal decision makers wield enormous power when they
characterize vexatious behaviour as something other than harassment.
Since a legal decision becomes a precedent against which future
decisions are evaluated, "[j]udicial opinions reify facts that could have
been presented from another point of view." 67 This makes it even
harder for future complainants to have their experiences recognized as
harassment. And, to the extent that this reconstruction abstracts the
conflict from broader social power dynamics, it becomes correspondingly
more difficult to change the workplace structures which encourage
harassment.
Yet the legal procedures that structure anti-discrimination
inquiries encourage an individualization of the conflicts. Under human
rights legislation, a complainant must prove both that the allegedly
harassing conduct occurred and that, under the circumstances, the
conduct constituted sexual harassment.68 As it is constructed, the
burden of proof individualizes the dynamics of sexual harassment, feeds
into the assumption that women bring false complaints about sexual
harassment, and makes the complainant's character, behaviour, and
motivations relevant legal facts. By attacking a woman's credibility in
this way, tribunals do not deny that the facts of harassment happened,
but structure those facts so that it appears unreasonable for the
complainant to have experienced them as harmful. Sexual harassment is
reduced to a matter of individual hysteria or vengefulness.69
66 1bd. at D/2982.
6 7 Fechner,supra note 18 at 502.
68 Gallvan, supra note 6 at 36.
69 C.A. MacKinnon, "Sexual Harassment: Its First Decade in Court" in MacKinnon, supra
note 41, 103 at 108. Some academics reject MacKinnon's characterization of sexual harassment as a
social problem of economic and sexual domination, and continue to insist that sexual harassment is
in fact a matter of individual sexual desire and preference. For an example of this view, see E.F.
Paul, "Sexual Harassment as Sex Discrimination: A Defective Paradigm" (1990) 8 Yale L & Pol'y
Rev. 333.
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It is very hard to prove that sexually-harassing behaviour
occurred, because often the only witnesses are the harasser and the
complainant. Alleged harassers can raise doubts about the existence of
the conduct by showing that the woman had motives to fabricate a
complaint. In Bell, an early case that is cited frequently in sexual
harassment jurisprudence, the complainant alleged that her employers
made crude propositions to her, commented on her sex life, slapped her
buttocks, and fired her when she complained. The employers responded
that she had been fired for incompetence, and that she was bringing the
complaint because she had subsequently been unemployed for seven
months and needed money. The adjudicator agreed that the possibility
of this motivation undermined her credibility.70 A more recent case,
Broomfield, applied the same logic. Ms. Broomfield had been sexually
harassed for two years, but did not make a formal complaint until she
was passed over for a promotion. She made no secret of the fact that the
economic retaliation motivated her complaint, and the tribunal held that
this cast a shadow on her credibility.7 1 Both Ms. Bell and Ms.
Broomfield lost their cases.
Theoretically, the standard of proof in discrimination cases is the
civil standard of a "balance of probabilities." But because the facts of
sexual harassment are open to a multitude of interpretations, it has been
held that for "conduct to be found harassment in the workplace because
of sex [it] must be consistent with the allegation of such gender-based
harassment and inconsistent with any other explanation."72 This burden,
in practice, approaches the criminal law standard of "beyond a
reasonable doubt." As in rape trials, the complainant's history is
analyzed in great detail. If a woman alleges that she was fired, not
promoted, or subjected to intense criticism because she rejected sexual
advances, her work history is scrutinized for other explanations which
could justify these penalties.73 Some tribunals have gone so far as to
70 Bell, supra note 33 at D/157.
71 Broomfield, supra note 43 at 359 and at 367-68. Ottawa Board of Education, supra note 37
took a slightly different approach regarding a woman's motive. At 178, it was held that the woman
only lodged a sexual harassment complaint because she had heard that her harasser had, at least
twice before, been relocated by his union because of sexual harassment charges. Rather than being
viewed as lending credibility to her complaint, this evidence was used to question her motives in
bringing the claim: "Had she not heard of his reputation, she would probably not have considered
that his attentions to her were serious enough to warrant reporting the matter to her supervisor."
72 Shaw, supra note 58 at D/59.
73 Bell, supra note 33 at D/157.
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analyze a woman's work record at jobs which predated the one in which
the allegation of harassment arose.74
In a similar vein, complainants must prove that the injuries they
suffered in fact resulted from the harassment and from no other source.
Backhouse and Cohen write that the pattern of injuries which sexual
harassment complainants suffer is so uniform that it has been recognized
as "sexual harassment syndrome." The syndrome manifests itself in
anger, shame, depression, nausea, headaches, insomnia, erosion of self-
confidence, and fear.75 Where women have presented these symptoms,
tribunals have held that they can be attributed just as easily to other
events in a woman's personal life-divorce, custody battles, and general
levels of stress.76 The fact that the harassment may have aggravated or
contributed to these symptoms is not considered relevant or actionable.
The analysis of a woman's credibility operates from the
presumption that women will bring false accusations.77 So, a woman's
behaviour on the witness-stand becomes highly relevant to the
disposition of a case. The fact that the complainant refused to look at
her alleged harasser, that she constantly wrung her hands while
testifying, that she became upset and had to leave the hearing room, or
that she could not provide exact dates for the incidents of harassment,
have all gone to undermine the complainant's credibility. 78 Such
conclusions ignore the real dynamics of, and the injuries that result from,
sexual harassment. When harassment creates a hostile environment, it
becomes a condition of work by definition. It pervades the workplace.
It is thus unreasonable to expect women to provide exact dates and times
to prove that the behaviour occurred. And when sexual harassment has
undermined a woman's self-confidence, it is likewise unreasonable to
expect her to remain calm and collected while giving testimony.
74 Watt, supra note 39 at D/2460.
75 Supra note 49 at 45.
76 Watt, supra note 39 at D/2463. In coraE, supra note 53 at 404, a woman's claim that she
suffered stress-related injuries because her supervisor harassed her was dismissed. It was found that
she was ill, "not necessarily because he had done or was doing something particularly wrong, but
because of her instinctive emotional reactions to him" [emphasis added].
77 In fact, Torres, supra note 51 at D/861, begins with the warning that "[o]ne has to be careful
in assessing a complaint of sexual harassment ... [T]he accusation will sometimes be simply the
means of retaliation by a disgruntled, fired employee."
78 Broomfield, supra note 43 at 368-69.
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E. Defining Equality
It is important to analyze how tribunal jurisprudence makes it
difficult for women's complaints to be taken seriously, but an analysis of
what sort of equality successful complainants are able to win is just as
important. MacKinnon indicates that the sameness/difference approach
to equality enshrined in liberal rights discourse sets up two possible
analyses of a situation of inequality. The male standard prescribes that,
to the extent that women are "the same as men," they should be treated
the same as men. The female standard prescribes that, to the extent that
women are "different from men," they require protective legislation
which allows them to be treated differently. But MacKinnon warns that
this analysis conceals
the substantive way in which man has become the measure of all things ... Gender
neutrality is thus simply the male standard, and the special protection rule is simply the
female standard, but do not be deceived: masculinity, or maleness, is the referent for
both.79
This analysis assumes that the male and female standards are not
themselves shaped by existing power imbalances between men and
women. And when sexual harassment jurisprudence adopts the
sameness/difference approach, it thereby overlooks the consequences of
social power imbalances in the workplace.
Re Canada Post Corp. v. Canadian Union of Postal Workers
(Gibson)8 0 typifies the law's uncritical assumption that existing
conditions in the workplace are sex-neutral. It makes male workplace
culture the standard against which equality is measured. In Canada Post,
a woman became the first permanent female employee at a Canada Post
loading dock. When she complained of, primarily, verbal sexual
harassment, her harasser was fired, but the trade union grieved that he
had been dismissed without just cause. Arbitrator Swan found that
[i]n this essentially male atmosphere, an ethos not unlike that of the proverbial locker-
room appears to have developed. The work often involves heavy physical labour, and the
employees tend to converse in a correspondingly rough fashion. There is a good deal of
generally insulting comment, more or less good-natured, as well as stories, jokes and
comments of an explicitly sexual nature, all punctuated by the regular use of obscene and
blasphemous language. The female employee testified that she had been led to expect
79 "Difference and Dominance: On Sex Discriminaation" in MacKinnon, supra note 41, 32 at
34.
80 (1987), 27 L.A.C. (3d) 27 [hereinafter Canada Post].
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this kind of atmosphere, and that she had been told by fellow employees that if she
wanted to work on the dock she would simply have to put up with it.81
Swan concluded that there were few comments which would not be
tolerated on the dock, and that the woman herself admitted using
"obscene and insulting language." 82 Swan characterized her as "not only
a tolerant victim, but an active participant, in the perpetuation of this
atmosphere."83 The arbitration board upheld the dismissal, but did so
on the ground that "even by the standards of the dock, the grievor's
conduct went too far."84 Ultimately, then, the standard of objective
reasonableness set out in formal provisions against sexual harassment is,
in practice, transformed into a highly contextualized subjective standard:
it becomes the standard of the reasonable harasser in that workplace.8 5
Tribunals dealing with sexual harassment in traditionally male
workplaces ignore several important facts in evaluating what constitutes
harassment and what constitutes equality. Tribunals overlook the fact
that many women working in traditionally male industries are often the
only female workers on their shifts. This social isolation makes the
incidents of sexual harassment ever more threatening.86 The voluntary-
assumption-of-risk attitude posited by Swan disregards the fact that
women need to "play along" with male culture in order to deflect more
harassment. A female road-maintenance worker in Watt testified that,
"[i]n order to try to be accepted with them ... you have to put yourself at
their level and then when it comes time to go home, then you go back to
yourself."8 7 In this case, as in Canada Post, the fact that the woman
acted like "one of the boys" undermined the credibility of her claim that
she found the harassing behaviour vexatious.
81TIid. at 29.
82 ]bid at 45.
83IbLi
84 ]bid. at 46.
85 See Watt, supra note 39 for another example of a female employee harassed in a
traditionally male-dominated workplace. But this acceptance of the status quo in workplace
environments is not limited to traditionally male-dominated establishments. Aragona, supra note 33
held that, since almost all of the female employees at the establishment had accepted the employer's
physical and verbal sexual conduct towards them, they had acquiesced in the atmosphere and could
not later claim that the man's conduct constituted harassment.
86 The perception of the threat increases, but so does the actual threat and danger. See, for
example, the testimony of women in Canadian National Railway Co. v. Canada (Canadian Human
Rights Commission), [1987] 1 S.C.R. 1114 [hereinafter cNR].
8 7 Ms. Marshall quoted in Watt, supra note 39 at D/2454.
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Tribunals also overlook the fact that male workplace culture
gives male workers as a group the collective social power to intimidate
their female co-workers. Although a male worker may hold the same or
even a lower rank in the workplace hierarchy than his female
co-worker/supervisor,
[t]he power of male rapport means that nonsupervisory male workers may enjoy a
camaraderie with their male supervisors that allows them to exploit the (male) power
reflected from the supervisors. 88
Human rights litigation, then, provides formal equality. It assumes that,
once women have entered a workplace, equality is served by treating
men and women in the same way. In practice, this means that women
must accommodate themselves to the social and institutional norms
already in place at the establishment, although women have had no part
in shaping those norms8 9 But substantive equality would require that
these social patterns change to accommodate women, because they
constitute the foundation which supports sexual harassment.
Human rights jurisprudence has assumed that giving women
equal rights in the workplace is compatible with the notion that nothing
fundamental need change between the way men and women interact
socially. Tribunals have in fact argued that human rights legislation was
never intended to shape social behaviour. A leading American case,
Rabidue v. Osceola Refining Co.,90 is cited often in Canadian decisions
for the proposition that
it cannot seriously be disputed that in some work environments, humor and language are
rough hewn and vulgar. Sexual jokes, sexual conversations and girlie magazines may
abound. Title VII [legislation against discrimination] was not meant ... to bring about a
magical transformation in the social mores of American workers.91
But human rights legislation was in fact enacted for that very purpose: to
change social mores in contexts where discrimination against less
powerful social groups is the accepted practice. Those who oppose
legislation against sexual harassment, however, have recast the conflict
as one not about discrimination, but about free speech.
88 Gallivan, supra note 6 at 33. See also Ottawa Board of Education, supra note 37; and D.
Field, "Coercion or Male Culture: A New Look at Co-Worker Harassment" in L Briskin & L
Yanz, eds., Union Sisters: Women in the Labour Movement, (Toronto: Women's Press, 1983) 144 at
147-50.
89 D.L. Rhode, "The 'No-Problem' Problem: Feminist Challenges and Cultural Change"
(1990-1991) 100 Yale LU. 1731 at 1755.
90 584 F. Supp. 419 (E.D. Mich. 1984) [hereinafter Rabidue].
91 Ibid at 430.
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Bell is routinely cited for the proposition that the Ontario
Human Rights Code "ought not to be seen or perceived as inhibiting free
speech."92 This passage from Torres is invoked with a similar purpose:
ITihere are some employers (and employees) who simply arc very crude and who speak
in bad taste in discussing in the workplace their relationships with the opposite sex, or in
telling sex "jokes." It is not the intent, or effect, of the Human Rights Code, or the
function of aBoard of Inquiry, to pass judgment upon such persons.93
Freedom of speech is one of the highest constitutional values in a liberfil
society, and it is a brave legal institution indeed which will place limits
on speech. Doubts persist about whether the behaviour women identify
as sexual harassment is indeed harmful, and the free speech discourse
encourages tribunals to treat laws against discrimination not as rules
prohibiting conduct which results in social and economic injury, but as
guidelines for a new protectionist morality. This construction of the law
makes tribunals reluctant to find men guilty of sexual harassment,
because
there are risks of unfairness in proscribing conduct that cannot be dearly defined, that is
a fairly common, if unfortunate feature of our social environment, and that has not been
previously understood to be unlawful in any sense.94
Tribunals express the concern that "relations between the sexes may be
chilled if men fear that behaviour offensive to a sensitive woman may be
actionable in court,"95 and that "the work place may become more dull
as a result."96
The free speech discourse treats sexual harassment as a matter
of "mere" sexism, a matter of an individual's misinformed opinions
which are not indicative of broader social injuries. Tribunals that
characterize sexist social conduct in the workplace as private behaviour
which is beyond the reach of the law,9 respond to sexual harassment by
invoking the defence of "cultural determinism":98 men who have grown
92 Supra note 33 at D/156.
93 Supra note 51 at D/861.
94 Wat, supra note 39 at D/2456.
95 bId [emphasis added].
96 Broomfiedd, supra note 43 at 37L
97 See, for example, Watt, supra note 39 at D2465.
98 Rhode, supra note 89 at 1781. See also cuE, supra note 53 at 408, where the sexual
harassment was characterized as a personality dash:
The problems may have resulted in part from the sexist structure of our society, where
men are usually the bosses and women are the subordinates, even though the woman in
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up in a sexist culture cannot be expected to act in non-sexist ways. What
emerges is the presumption that male socialization and male public
aspirations are non-negotiable whereas women's are. The free speech
discourse relies on an implied community-standards test to determine
what sort of speech is permissible. Again, Rabidue is cited to show that
sexual harassment litigation attempts to impose a restrictive morality. In
Rabidue, a female worker alleged that the pin-ups which covered her
workplace created a hostile environment for women workers. The Court
held that
[for better or worse, modem America features open displays of written and pictorial
erotica. Shopping centres, candy stores and prime time television regularly display
pictures of naked bodies and erotic real or simulated sex acts. Living in this milieu, the
average American should not be legally offended by sexually explicit posters.99
But sexual harassment is not about women being "offended;" it is about
men undermining women's personal integrity and economic potential in
the workforce. The free speech/morality discourse abstracts sexual
harassment from real power relations and transforms it into a contest
between abstract rights. This discourse again assumes that the patterns
of social interaction that exist in the workplace and in society at large
represent substantive equality, and that words and pictures cannot inflict
emotional and economic injuries on women in the workplace. But
general workplace culture does not provide women with social and
economic equality, and this is the very state of affairs that rights against
sexual harassment were intended to rectify.
IV. TOWARDS A WORKABLE REMEDY
Ultimately, human rights legislation fails to provide an adequate
avenue of redress for many women. The legal power to define
harassment rests overwhelmingly with legal decision makers who have
subjected complainants to as much, or more, scrutiny as their harassers.
Although human rights tribunals are empowered to act proactively, in
practice the scheme is primarily complaint-driven, and it currently takes
three years before a complaint will be heard by a tribunal. 0° This gives
many work relationships may have more intelligence than her supervisor. This can create
problems when his authority is challenged ... But the male supervisors responses or anger
cannot be immediately characterized as sexual harassment.
9 9 Supra note 90 at 433 [emphasis in the original].
100 P. Todd, "Ontario rights body called dismal failure" The Toronto Star (30 August 1991)
AM0, and M.G. Crawford, "Human Rights Commissions: Politically Correct Predators?" Canadian
Lawyer (October 1991) 16.
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complainants very little control over the legal proceedings and
undermines the effectiveness of the available remedies. In order to
assess how useful rights against sexual harassment are for promoting
equality, it is necessary to look at the remedies they provide and to
envisage alternative ways of structuring the rights discourse, so that it
will be more effective in eradicating discrimination.
Human rights legislation is meant to be remedial rather than
punitive. Consequently, the damages that can be secured are limited.
Both the Canadian and the Ontario human rights codes allow tribunals
to issue a broad range of orders to curtail ongoing, and to prevent
future, harassment. Successful complainants can also claim lost wages
plus interest, and special damages of up to $5,000 (federal) or $10,000
(provincial) for mental anguish.101 While successful complainants
regularly receive monetary compensation, tribunals rarely order
employers to change their work practices.10 2 Occasionally, tribunals will
make offenders promise not to harass other female workers in the
future. But because these remedies do not provide sufficient financial or
legal incentives to restructure work habits, there is no long-term
deterrent to harassment. And the losses the complainant has suffered
are not adequately compensated by the monetary awards. Because they
have been dismissed, actively or constructively, most complainants are
unemployed at the time of the complaint. The trauma of sexual
harassment syndrome makes it difficult for them to seek or hold another
job. The resulting losses in seniority, pension benefits, and skills training
are not measured when reimbursing women for their lost wages and
mental anguish.
Because human rights jurisprudence balances the right to be safe
from sexual harassment against the right of free speech and the right of
management to organize production, "the social construction of
sexuality and the social relations of power in which sexual practices take
place fade into the background. ' 0 3 But, if the rights discourse were
101 Human Rights Code, supra note 5, s. 40(1)(b); Canadian Human Rights Ac4 supra note 5, s.
53(3).
102 cNm, supra note 86 is a rare example in which a human rights tribunal ordered the
offending employer to implement an employment equity hiring plan. It did, however, take three
years of litigation before the Supreme Court of Canada approved the remedy as being within the
jurisdiction of the tribunal. And complainants seeking monetary damages are not necessarily more
successful. After seven years of litigation, the plaintiffs in Janzen, supra note 3 were awarded a
generous settlement, only to find that they were unable to collect their award because their former
employers had disappeared: see "Money gone, victors find" The [Toronto] Globe and Mail (3
January 1992) A6.
103 "Entrenching a Bill of Rights," supra note 19 at 459.
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structured differently, it would allow women more control over the legal
process and could produce more effective remedies. The following is a
brief examination of the promises of rights discourses that could emerge
from tort law, conciliation, and occupational health and safety.
Sexually harassing conduct could be made the basis of a tort
action for assault and battery, intentional interference with contractual
relations, or intentional infliction of nervous shock and emotional
distress.104 A tort action is advantageous for complainants because it
allows them to bring their cases to trial more quickly, to retain control
over the development of the case, and to seek larger damage awards.
But there are also procedural and strategic disadvantages.
The Supreme Court of Canada, in Board of Governors of the
Seneca College of Applied Arts and Technology v. Bhadauria,105 held that
discrimination under the Ontario Human Rights Code does not give rise
to a tort of discrimination, or to a cause of action for a breach of
statutory duty. The discrimination alleged must, therefore, be
challenged directly under the Code. Since Seneca College dealt with the
creation of a new tort of discrimination, it is not clear whether this ruling
would effectively bar a cause of action under traditional tort categories.
If a tort action can be brought, a complainant must still face the same
ideological prejudice that she faces under human rights litigation: she
must prove that the alleged conduct in fact constitutes an injury. And
because of the (hetero)sex paradigm, "[w]omen are, it seems, supposed
to consider acts in this tradition harmless. '1 06 Moreover, a woman must
bear the costs of hiring a lawyer, and the remedy of reinstatement to her
job is not available. Tort law, which is inherently individualistic, also
poses a serious strategic problem because it characterizes sexual
harassment as a private harm:
To the extent that tort theory fails to capture the broadly social sexuality/employment
nexus that comprises the injury of sexual harassment, by treating the incidents as if they
are outrages particular to an individual woman rather than integral to her social status as
a woman worker, the personal approach on the legal level fails to analyze the relevant
dimensions of the problem.
0 7
Because it overlooks the social and economic dimensions of sexual
harassment, tort law also entails the risk of according legal weight to a
1 0 4 Backhouse & Cohen, supra note 49 at 141-42.
105 [1981] 2 S.C.R. 181 [hereinafter Seneca College].
106 Sexual Harassment, supra note 2 at 166.
10 7 1W. at 88.
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restrictive definition of female sexuality and public morality. Finally,
tort law can only be activated after an actual injury has been suffered.
Informal mediation and occupational health and safety
legislation are two alternative constructions of the sexual harassment
rights discourse, which aim to empower women to exercise their rights
before the injury of sexual harassment becomes too severe.
Informal mediation may encourage more women to bring
complaints (it is clear that sexual harassment is vastly under-reported),
and may facilitate workplace education on sexual harassment. Many
complainants who use the internal mediation procedures available in
their workplaces attest that, if that were their only option, they would
not launch a formal complaint or participate in a formal hearing. They
cite many reasons, including shame, fear of retaliation, desire to keep
the proceeding private, desire to avoid disrupting workplace relations,
and concern that they could not establish sufficient proof to succeed at a
formal hearing.108 Mediation focuses on building trust, educating
instead of punishing, changing attitudes, and restoring relations between
people who must continue to work together.109 Debbie Field argues that
this avenue may be particularly valuable for women working in
traditionally male industries who are harassed by male co-workers. In
this unionized context, a complaint to an employer or to an external
judicial body would likely result in increased harassment on the shop
floor, because the complainant's "co-workers would have seen her as a
'rat', someone who broke ranks and tattled on fellow workers."110
But informal mediation poses the same strategic problems as tort
actions do. Mediation individualizes the conflict, so much so that several
mediators refer to sexual harassment as an "interpersonal conflict"111
rather than as "a form of social violence."112 Privatizing the conflict fails
to address the fact that many women blame themselves for the
108 H. Gadlin, "Careful Maneuvers: Mediating Sexual Harassment" (1991) 7:2 Negotiation J.
139 at 143; and M.P. Rowe, "People Who Feel Harassed Need a Complaint System with Both
Formal and Informal Options" (1990) 6:2 Negotiation J. 161 at 164-65 [hereinafter "Formal and
Informal Options"].
109 See M.P. Rowe, "Helping People Help Themselves: An ADR Option for Interpersonal
Conflict" (1990) 6:3 Negotiation J. 239 [hereinafter "Interpersonal Conflict"]; and J. Rifldn,
"Mediation from a Feminist Perspective: Promise and Problems" (1984) 2 Law & Ineq. 21.
110 Field, supra note 88 at 151.
111 See "Formal and Informal Options," supra note 108; "Interpersonal Conflict," supra note
109; and Rifldn, supra note 109 at 29-30.
112 Catherine Frazee, Chief Commissioner of the Ontario Human Rights Commission, quoted
in Crawford, supra note 100 at 22.
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harassment that has occurred, and so downplay the nature of the injury.
This feeds into the mythology that sexual harassment is misdirected
sexual interest. Moreover, there is always the danger that the power
dynamics that allowed sexual harassment to develop will be replicated in
the mediation session, with the result that the complainant will be
unable to ask for and receive the form of restitution which she would
prefer.
An effective exercise of rights against sexual harassment must
make the cost of such behaviour public. As an example, a Black woman
who worked at a Colgate-Palmolive factory endured six years of
extremely vicious sexual and racial harassment, before suffering physical
and psychological damage that led her to quit her job, and that has
prevented her from working in the years since her constructive dismissal.
In 1991, she was awarded benefits by a Workers' Compensation Appeals
Tribunal.113 This was an important decision because it recognized that
sexual harassment causes both physical and emotional injury. But it
should not be necessary to endure sexual harassment up to the point that
workers' compensation becomes a necessity. Still, the Colgate-Palmolive
case raises the issue of whether women will be able to use occupational
health and safety legislation to avoid such injuries.
Women who have been harassed exhibit a pattern of stress-
related illnesses-"weight loss, diarrhoea, sleeplessness, headaches,
fatigue ... loss of self-worth, acute depression, anxiety, and
nervousness."zz 4 Sexual harassment also causes objective work-related
dangers, because it distracts women from the job they are supposed to
be performing. If these health hazards are recognized, a woman could
use section 43(3) of the Ontario Occupational Health and Safety Act115 to
exercise her right to refuse work that she has reason to believe may
cause injury to herself or to others. Under the Act, an immediate
internal investigation must take place. If, following the in-house
investigation, the complainant still has reasonable grounds to fear for
her health and safety, she may continue to refuse to work. An
investigation by the Ministry of Labour will ensue, during which no other
employee may be assigned the work unless that employee has been
113 Hearings Officer Decision, Workers' Compensation Board, 29 June 1990; and
"Harassment compensation stands" The [Toronto] Globe and Mail (4 October 1991) A9. See also
Decision 636/91 (1992), 21 W.CAT.R. 277.
114 M. Cornish & L. Trachuk, "The Bonita Clark Case-Sexual Harassment in
Non-Traditional Work" in Legal Issues for Women (Vancouver. Continuing Legal Education Society
of British Columbia, 1988) 4.1.01 at 4.1.05.
115 R.S.O. 1990, c. 0.1.
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informed of the previous refusal and the reasons for it. The complainant
will be assigned alternative work during the investigation and will be
paid regular or premium wages. She is also shielded from employer
retaliation.116
Although it has yet to be used in sexual harassment litigation, the
occupational health and safety legislation gives women the strongest
protection of their rights.117 It enables a woman to be proactive, since
she need not suffer an actual injury before she can exercise her right to
refuse.1 8 Moreover, because the Act imposes on the employer the duty
to "take every precaution reasonable in the circumstances for the
protection of a worker," 119 the right to refuse work effectively makes
sexual harassment the responsibility of the entire workplace. The
obstacles to using this legislative scheme are that most women do not
work in unionized settings, and do not have health and safety
committees that could support their claims or set up a buffer between
themselves and their employers or harassers.
V. CONCLUSION
Sexual harassment, then, can be approached through several
legal routes. This demonstrates that the rights discourse can be
structured in a variety of ways which may be more or less effective in
addressing the social problems involved in sexual harassment. Tort law,
mediation, and occupational health and safety legislation are valuable
frameworks, because they remain clearly focused on the injury that a
woman has suffered. These approaches avoid the de-contextualization
of human rights discourse, which frames the legal relevance of sexual
harassment in terms of a conflict between abstract rights. Human rights
legislation remains mired in a formal equality discourse and, to the
extent that other legislative schemes allow one to work towards a
substantive equality and to change the structures of the workplace, they
should be pursued. Ultimately, however, feminist reformers must not
place too much faith in the law. Smart warns that
116Ibid. ss. 43, 50.
117 This power to exercise work-refusal rights in the context of sexual harassment has been
enshrined in at least two collective agreements: cuPE Local 1 in its agreement with Toronto Hydro;
and the Canadian Auto Workers union in its agreement with the Big Three car manufacturers.
118 Cornish & Trachuk, supra note 114 at 4.1.04.
119 Occupational Health and Safety Act, supra note 115, s. 25(2) (h).
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legal rights do not resolve problems. Rather they transpose the problem into one that is
defined as having a legal solution ... the solution may itself do little to alter the power
relations that remain intact.120
The exercise of rights and the use of litigation are only a part (albeit a
tremendously powerful one) of the dialectic between rights and politics
out of which social reform grows. Indirectly, legal discourse can achieve
many valuable objectives. It can raise political consciousness, dramatize
a particular form of social injustice, and generate funds for a political
movement.1 21 But sexual harassment cannot be solved in isolation from
all the other aspects of female/male socialization and power distribution
which underpin it. The concentration on rights discourse must not
deflect from the necessity to alter other powerful discourses-those
shaping the broader social and economic structures which constrain the
exercise of rights. 122
120 Supra note 7 at 144.
121 Hutchinson, supra note 25 at 365.
122 Rhode, supra note 89 at 1742.
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